

The Illusory Self: David Hume and Early Buddhism on Personal Identity

XIAORUI XIONG

ABSTRACT

Both David Hume and Buddhism provides arguments refuting the existence of a personal identity, with evidence based on the fact that we cannot find an unchanging self within us. However, the differing views that the two philosophical systems hold toward the essence of causality is closely linked to their way of explaining the illusory nature of the self and indicates fundamental differences between the two theories. The contrasting context and purpose of the ideologies lead to contrasting meaning behind the seemingly similar denials of the self, with Hume aiming for revelation while Buddhism for guidance.

INTRODUCTION

As a concept that seem born into humans, the idea of personal identity has long been the discussion topic of various philosophers. Out of the theories explaining how personal identity exists within us, the theory raised by British philosopher David Hume is definitely one of the most remarkable, for he endeavors to explain why personal identity does not in reality exist. Due to similar ideas and reasoning, many scholars have compared this theory to another philosophical theory distant in time and space - the early Buddhist theory of no-self (anattā or anātman). Both these theories give clear, justifiable reasons for why personal identity is merely an illusion.

We may be inclined to think that one of these explanations contains the other, or one can be seen as simply another expression of the other. In this essay, I will go through the two theories, summarizing how Hume, in his works *A Treatise on Human Nature* and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, used his sceptic view to question whether we can reliably know there to be a self-based only on our perceptions, and explaining how early Buddhism, in the Nikayas and other early Sutras, deconstructs a person's existence to demonstrate how no permanent self exists in any way. Contrasting the two theories, I will find and clarify a clear difference between them: their attitude and conception towards causation: whereas Hume regards causation as yet another illusion caused by perceptions, Buddhism puts the dependent origination between objects and the

Xiaorui Xiong
Shenzhen Middle School, Shenzhen, 518000, China

causal connectedness that links every event to another to construct a web of cause and effect as a cornerstone of its doctrines.

Seemingly unrelated to the discussion of identity, these different approaches to causality in fact reflect how the two systems, within their larger ideological contexts, put forward the refutation of personal identity for different reasons and purposes. Hume's illusory self is an extension of his skepticism when applied to the identity issue and is solely a theoretical product that does not aim to change how people behave in their lives aside from the metaphysical level. Buddhism, on the other hand, utilizes the concept of no-self as a doctrine and truth that should be followed within life, guiding believers to attain spiritual freedom on a practical level. Holding contrasting agendas and serving different roles in their corresponding context, neither of the two theories of the denial of the self can be reduced to the other.

HUMEAN SKEPTICISM

Within all the topics that Hume covered, his philosophy is mostly, if not entirely, centered on his empiricism, the belief that all human knowledge is based on experiences and perceptions. Therefore, according to Hume the study of how humans perceive should be prior to any study on other fields, as these cannot be investigated while avoiding the use of perception. In the introduction of his magnum opus *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume claims that all sciences are related to "human nature", and "even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of man; since they lie under the cognizance of men and are judged of by their powers and faculties."

From this epistemology, it is natural to come to the conclusion of philosophical skepticism: it is impossible to obtain any true and completely "objective" knowledge of the world, since no truth we attempt to learn can escape being distorted by the process of us perceiving it. Hume applied this assertion to various problems, arguing that many ideas we believe should be true - such as morals - are no more than mere assumptions we imagine from the experiences we go through, and are very possibly false. He puts forward the idea that "The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; but does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time... The consequence seems nowise necessary." Hume refuted the legitimacy of induction, in other words, inferring the universal fact from previously observed particular cases, as a way of gaining knowledge, pointing out that there is no reason to expect anything to work in the same way in the future and the unobserved present as it does when observed in the past. It is only our consistent experiences that tricks us into the tendency of thinking so.

When referring to personal identity, or the "self" so frequently referred to in our daily lives, Hume's attitude is no different. His view claims that when the idea of self, or self-consciousness arise in a person, it is always accompanied by "some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure", and one can never "catch oneself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception". In fact, the idea of the self is based on "nothing more than a bundle

or collection of different perceptions”. This gives the theory the name of “bundle theory” of personal identity. Hume then takes a step further and asserts that there is no “any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment”, since all of our perceptions are constantly changing, causing our self-consciousness to also change every moment. An unchanging self is only a quality we make up and artificially ascribe to ourselves.

The reason we are inclined to believe that there is such a thing as personal identity, Hume states, is that the perceptions we experience are either similar or in our opinions causally connected, to the extent that our minds naturally process them smoothly from one moment of perception to the next. Not realizing that our perceptions are constantly changing and interrupted, the self “[proceeds] entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas”, which seem to us to be overall the same idea due to the easy transition between them. The self is created to explain why the things that are perceived over time are somehow “unchanging” - there is an unchanging percipient linking the perceptions together.

Using his empiricism, Hume argued that it is in fact impossible to gain any certain knowledge and criticized the idea of a self with “perfect identity and simplicity” by stating that we only have perceptions, which do not contain such a self. It is only by the causal connection between them, which is imputed by our minds, that we connect discrete perceptions together into something that seems unchanging.

BUDDHIST NO-SELF THEORY

In response to the theory of self-held by Brahmanism, which claims that the self (ātman) is an unchanging power and absolute consciousness within us that ultimately controls what we do, early Buddhism claimed that there is in reality no self (anattā or anātman) in a human being and that the self we feel is just an illusion we create. Buddhist texts argue for this position in various ways, of which deconstruction and logical reasoning are two of the most popular.

To analyze the self, Buddhism deconstructs the person into five “aggregates”, or skandhas, that are supposed to be all that a person is. They are: (1) rūpa: matter or the physical body; (2) vedanā: sensations or feelings; (3) saṃjñā: perceptions of sense objects; (4) saṃskāras: mental formations or volitional forces such as wishes and desires; (5) vijñāna: consciousness of oneself as a being with mental activities. When teaching the removal of desire from a person, the Buddha “teaches the removal of desire and lust for form... feeling... perception... volitional formations... consciousness.” must possess all of the five skandhas, and nothing beyond them. If an unchanging self exists within a person, it must exist within the range of the skandhas.

Buddhism then investigates the problem of which parts of the skandhas are permanent and unchanging, since that must be where the self belongs. However, it is argued that in fact “Form is like a lump of foam, feeling like a water bubble; perception is like a mirage, volitions like a plantain trunk, and consciousness like an illusion.” When closely examined, each of the five skandhas are “void, hollow, insubstantial”,

impermanent and under constant change. There is not one part that remains the same after any given moment. Therefore, the only logical conclusion to make is that there is no “self” from the beginning.

This idea is further demonstrated in the *Milindapañha*, in which the monk Nāgasena claims to the Indo-Greek king Menander I that in reality “no permanent individual can be found” that can be referred to as “Nāgasena”. Confused, the king asked the monk if Nāgasena is any of the five aggregates, all of these combined, or something outside of them. Having received all negative answers, the king concluded that “Nāgasena is an empty sound. Who is it we see before us? It is a falsehood that your reverence has spoken.”

Hearing this, Nāgasena asked king Menander if the chariot that he came in was its axle, its wheels, its chassis, its reins, its yoke, all of these combined, or something apart from these. The king replied negatively to all of these but asserted that “it is because it has all these parts that it comes under the term chariot.” Nāgasena approved this view, and pointed out that personal identity, similar to “chariot”, is a concept we artificially assign to the five skandhas as a convenient saying and corresponds to no real existence.

Apart from the deconstruction analysis, Buddhism provided another explanation of no-self: a proof by contradiction from the perspective of experience. In the *Maha-nidana Sutra*, the Buddha’s disciple Ananda points out that there are three ways to consider the self: “Feeling is myself... Feeling is not myself, my self is without experience of feeling... Feeling is not myself, but my self is not without experience of feeling; My self feels, for my self is subject to feeling.” (the *Maha-nidana Sutra*, 27) In other words, the hypothetical unchanging self should be either the same as experience, something apart from experience, or having some qualities or attributes of experience but differs from it.

The Buddha then refutes each of these three ways of considering the self, demonstrating that none of them are valid. The first possibility clearly does not make sense: it is considering the self as “something which, even here and now, is impermanent, a mixture of pleasure and pain, and subject to a rising and falling away”, and this contradicts with the definition that a self is an unchanging entity perceiving experiences. When investigating the other two possibilities, it is found that they too contradict a basic fact: we cannot by any means separate the self from experience; the self never shows up when there is no experience for it to reflect upon, and without experience there is “nothing at all that is felt”. As there is no distinction to be made, “the idea ‘I am’” cannot occur, so it is invalid to claim that the self more or less possesses qualities different from experience, and therefore the rest two possibilities are invalid. Since the fact that none of the possibilities can be true contradicts the condition that there is a self, the condition of an unchanging self must be false.

For Buddhism, the use of language works as a misleading factor influencing people to think in terms of self. Hearing phrases such as “I am” “I want” every day, people tend to preconceive that the self is sure to exist and tries to find it from perceptions. Observing that perceptions are indeed somewhat united by “causal connectedness”, we come to the false assumption that it is the self that maintains this unity. This assumption creates what Buddhism calls “self-attachment” and is further reinforced by “the three poisons” that all human beings are born with: greed, hatred or aversion, and ignorance or delusion.

Ignorant of the truth, we greedily think that things can be truly possessed by our “selves”, and hateful, unpleasant things need to be kept away from our “selves”, leading to deeper self-attachment. Our delusions become so deeply rooted in our minds that even if we are told the truth and logically accept it, we still tend to get tricked into thinking as if there is a self, which exacerbates the arising of desires.

As Buddhism refutes the idea of personal identity, though, it also makes clear that there is no need to avoid reference to personal identity when communicating in our lives. Referring to the five skandhas as “I” does not necessarily indicate that one is under the delusion of a permanent personal identity, rather it is only used as a convenient device when conveying ideas to others. When talking to King Menander, Nāgasena claimed that this name of his is “a designation in common use”. It can even be “true” to say that “I” exist in regard to the conventional truth, which differs from being to being and is heavily influenced by perceptions. As its name suggests, conventional truth are true in that it helps beings understand the world and carry out necessary actions. The second level of truth - the ultimate truth - is what the world “really” is, and what we should all believe in firmly, but there is no reason for us not to stick with our beliefs of the conventional truth in our lives, as long as we can separate these two levels of truths.

BUDDHIST THOUGHT & HUME

It is not hard to draw parallel between Hume’s and Buddhism’s views of personal identity. Both Hume and Buddhism analyze the relationship between the hypothetical self and human experiences, and come to the conclusion that the self is not the same as experiences, yet only exists along with them; both observe that there is no unchanging identity behind the perceptions of humans, only a fictitious being created by our minds from these perceptions; both claim that we tend to take this illusion as the truth because of our conventional use of language, and the “connectedness” between passing perceptions. In these aspects, it seems that we can say that in regard to personal identity, Buddhism’s philosophy falls prey to Hume’s skepticism.

However, if we take a closer look at the broader ideas of the two philosophical systems, there is one fundamental difference between Hume’s and Buddhism’s philosophy: they disagree about the role of causation in creating the illusion of the self. While it is acknowledged by both that the causal relationship between our perceptions is what makes us tend to believe in personal identity, Hume and Buddhism hold contrasting, or even opposing views toward causation itself.

As an empiricist, Hume claimed that our knowledge of causation solely comes from our experiences and observations, rather than logic and reason. We observe that event B always comes in succession of event A and come to the conclusion that A causes B to happen. However, for Hume, we can know no more of causation other than it is a pattern that events follow when observed in the past. Hume directly states that “causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience.” Correlation does not equal to causation, even when correlation is constant occurring under observation in the past, and “the union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, resolves itself into a customary

association of ideas”. There is no logical basis for us to believe in any causal connection between A and B - we are just falling under the induction fallacy and associating A and B together.

This association, according to Hume, is solely because of the “habit or determination” of our minds, which naturally links two independent events together. Since it is simply a summary of what we experienced in the past, it does not necessarily hold true in the future. The future is full of new possibilities and very likely does not follow the predictions we make from our limited perceptions. Seeing the sun rise every day in the past cannot help us determine whether it will rise tomorrow. It is only for the sake of convenience that human nature omits the logical fallacy of induction and expects the future to work in the same way as the past.

To Hume, it is only when having this fictitious causation as basis that we derive the fictitious notion of a self: “Had we no memory, we never [should] have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person.” If the concept of causation is cleared from our minds, then we would not be able to link our perceptions together, and the illusion of the self will not arise.

On the other hand, cause and effect serve as one of the most essential truths in early Buddhism. The Buddha says in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*: “Form... is of an impermanent nature. Feeling... Perception... Volitional formations... Consciousness is of an impermanent nature.” A further explanation says he dwells contemplating rise and fall in the five aggregates subject to clinging: ‘Such is form, such its origin, such its passing away; such is feeling... perception... volitional formations... such is consciousness, such its origin, such its passing away.’ As he dwells thus contemplating rise and fall in the five aggregates subject to clinging... the underlying tendency ‘I am’ that has not yet been uprooted - this comes to be uprooted.

By examining the nature of change and “rise and fall” in the five aggregates, one comes to realize the falsehood of “self”.

As time passes, nothing can persist any of its qualities and prevent itself from changing. That an object, a concept, a person seems to exist currently is because of the numerous causal links that lead to the components and conditions needed, or *pratyaya*, rising and coming together to form this certain entity. Since every causal link will move forward as time passes, the *pratyaya* of this entity will eventually fall and dissipate, and it will return to nothingness. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*, the Buddha directly refutes the idea of some brahmins that there is no causality and asserts: “Since there actually is causality, one who holds the view ‘there is no causality’ has wrong view.”

One of the “right views” of Buddhism urges its followers to achieve is to regard everything as in the process of the rising and falling of causal connections and are inherently “empty” and without a self. The Buddha taught Ananda that “whatever feelings arises with eye... ear... nose... tongue... body...mind contact as condition—whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant—that too is empty of self and of what belongs to self.” “Empty is the world.” Somewhat resembling subjective idealism, things “exist” because they are perceived by people, and perceptions exist because of past causes(*hetu*) making *pratyaya* coming together as results(*phala*). “Causal

connectedness” is what links everything together to makes the world operate, making one thing arise in dependence of another, trapping all sentient beings inside its waves, roaming endlessly in the ocean of samsara. This causal relationship, or *hetu-phala*, is arguably one of the most essential doctrines in early Buddhism, being the rule that the entire world with everything inside follows. It is so continuous and always in control that we become attached to the causal connectedness we experience and make up a fictitious self that is the percipient and reflector of outside stimulation that is in reality received by only the constantly changing five *skandhas*.

Hume’s skepticism puts the notion of causation on trial, pointing out that all causal links are derived from induction. But because induction stands no logical ground, experience-based causation can at any point fail us in the future. In contrast, early Buddhism puts the law of causation at a crucial place in its doctrines and teaches followers to view everything by its means. It can even be said that Hume’s “causation” and Buddhism’s “causal connectedness” are two different subjects, since Hume is referring to no more than a rule people tend to believe, an entirely subjective concept, while Buddhism refers to more of an inexorable force that runs the world of beings, one that we should all acknowledge.

THE REASON BEHIND THE DIFFERENCE

The difference in regard to causation or “causal connectedness” may seem like a minor contrast between Hume’s philosophy and Buddhism, but it is in fact caused by how the two philosophical systems composed their basic logic and demonstrates how fundamentally different their explanations on personal identity are despite similarities in some of their ideas.

Hume treated the view of a fictitious personal identity as simply one of the facts that skepticism reveals to the world. Depriving perceptions of the ability to convey any “real” knowledge, causation and the self are both tagged as “unreal” along with other beliefs formed from perception. This does not work as a guidance of any kind, nor does it tell people if believing in such illusions should be avoided for any reason. Hume confesses that “the utmost effort of human reason is, to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes”, even if the concept of cause and effect is based only on experience. In other words, his theory is solely a result of philosophizing, and has no wish to change the “real” lives of the people immersed in illusions in any way.

It should also be pointed out that this “fact” is derived from claiming that humans cannot possibly obtain knowledge of any fact of the world, which is a classical and fundamental paradox of radical skepticism. From his past experiences of not finding a “self” apart from certain perceptions, Hume himself applied induction to reach the conclusion that the self cannot exist without perceptions. For how can we know that the self cannot appear free from perceptions at some point in the future? Or is it the nature of perception that the “appearance” of the self should always be accompanied by it? To all

these Hume does not give a clear answer. Perhaps the only solution is to be skeptical of the act of being skeptical, and ultimately use one's theory to deny itself.

These paradoxes remain side products of Hume's philosophizing process. No ubiquitous answer can be found for them, and how each person chooses to live with them depends on, according to Hume's theory, what the mind chooses to believe is real and what is not. Facts can be believed in our minds, even if it is not what the "real" world is like. The situation of the "real" world is abandoned and disregarded, as the illusions in our minds are sufficient for us to survive.

Early Buddhism, on the other hand, draws a clear line between reality and illusions. It makes clear in the doctrine of the three marks of existence, that all existence has three characteristics: impermanence(*aniccā*), suffering(*dukkha*), and no-self(*anattā*). These doctrines themselves are regarded as truths in the system, and therefore tells us real, undeniable facts about existence, even as the rest, what we feel and assume about existence, identity, persistence, are all illusions. As a religion, Buddhism's aim is to convince its followers of the doctrines, help them achieve spiritual satisfaction and obtain the cessation of craving which is the goal of the Buddhist path and the same as being free from suffering. Therefore, it cannot afford to permit ambiguities that undermine its unity and reliability to exist within its philosophical system that are not explainable with its own religious theories. To avoid this, there needs to be a concrete, unchallenged ground that serves as the basis of reasoning.

Although personal identity, like in Hume's philosophy, is also regarded as a fiction in Buddhism, this must still be in some way compatible with Buddhist moral requirements, as well as other essential doctrines such as *samsara*—the repeated reincarnation of a life inside six realms before attaining enlightenment—and *karma*—one's deeds that accumulates to have consequences on one's future. If there is no certain identity, who then is trapped in *samsara* for countless lives, unable to be freed? In the *Milindapañha*, this essential question is also pondered by king Menander, as he asks Nāgasena "Who kills living beings, steals, commits adultery, tells lies or takes strong drink?" after the monk puts forward the theory of no-self. Buddhism realizes that if no-self is misunderstood, people may easily come to the conclusion that no responsibility is taken for our actions, just as king Menander asserts: "If what you say is true then there is neither merit nor demerit, nor is there any doer of good or evil deeds and no result of *kamma*(*karma*)."

The certainty of the rule of causation is what Buddhism provides as a remedy to these problems. There may not be an unchanging and reliable self within each person, but there is definitely the never-ending continuation of the causal connectedness of each being. Like all things, we are "empty" except for being part of a causal link that unifies our perception, and it is this link that carries our *karma*. In fact, Buddhism clearly articulates what this causal link is in the theory of dependent origination—twelve links that explains the coming of being of a person: Ignorance, volitional formations, consciousness, name and form, the six sense bases, contact, feeling, craving, clinging, existence, birth, and sufferings. With ignorance as the primary condition and primary

problem rooted deep within us, “such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering”, a causal link that defines our existence, and results in inextricable suffering.

So when asked about samsara and karma, Buddhism will say that it is the actions taken that influences the causal link “we” are experiencing, binds karma with this link and causes the chain to continue in an appropriate realm after the end of the current life. Being part of this chain, there is no way we can escape from it. What we can do, which is also the ultimate goal of early Buddhism, is to break this chain and cut off future causal connectedness by eliminating the primary cause—ignorance. As the Buddha teaches, “with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations... consciousness... name and form... aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.” With the cessation of ignorance this entire causal chain that controls a person breaks down, and the person finally attains nirvana, a state without any suffering.

Being able to successfully explain the legitimacy of the no-self theory, Buddhism uses it as a tool to further support its central doctrine: the destruction of attachments and desires, and tells us the reason we should not believe that there is a permanent self within the five skandhas. If one “regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form”, he “lives obsessed by the notions: ‘I am form, form is mine.’”, and does not realize that form is impermanent, and “changes and alters.” “With the change and alteration of form, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.” The same can be said about the other four skandhas, and overall thinking there is a self will inevitably cause suffering due to the nature of impermanence. Only by thinking there is no self can we not form any attachment and be “devoid of lust ... craving in regard to form ... consciousness”, and as they change, “sorrow, despair do not arise in one.” Letting go of the self not only just brings us closer to the ultimate truth, but also prevents us from extreme suffering and helps us get rid of other false desires, all contributing to the ultimate awakening.

Starting from the principles of skepticism, Hume developed his theories on personal identity solely motivated by the purpose to philosophize. At the end of the process intriguing conclusions are made, but there are still discontinuities in the chain of reasoning that seem to not have been dealt with by Hume’s own system and need the further elaborations and the theories of subsequent philosophers to come up with a feasible explanation. The theory of no-self in Buddhism, however, works to serve one overriding purpose - to guide its audience better understand and practice Buddhism. The problem brought up by agnosticism and nihilism are taken out by the acknowledgement of causation, and though there are still ambiguities and problems yet to be explained, no-self has fulfilled its aim of reinforcing the essential doctrines of Buddhism, rather than give explanations of the world, just like all other theories of Buddhism.

CONCLUSION

We have briefly gone through the basic ideas and logic of both Hume’s and Buddhist’s theory on personal identity, examined the different attitudes they treat

causation, and from that point found fundamental differences in the nature of these two theories. They do have much in common on the analysis and result level, but the contrasting objectives behind the creation of them points us to entirely opposite directions if we are to follow the trail further. The Buddhist idea of no-self cannot be regarded as advocating skepticism, nor can it be limited to a mere philosophizing. It does not aim to work as a revelation of the world's truth, but rather as a guide for one to get rid of all suffering on a practical level. In contrast, Human skepticism itself cannot be seen as advice or guide to its audience, as it does not claim that our illusions are a problem, nor does it offer any way for us to break free from them. Rather, it presents itself to be objective observations and deductions of how the world really is. As we investigate how personal identity is denied in both theories, we should not neglect what caused these theories to exist in the first place. Only when we take that into consideration can we better understand how and why the illusory nature of personal identity is important to Hume, to Buddhists, and to us.

REFERENCES

1. Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya*. Oxford: Pali Text Society and Wisdom Publications, 2000.
2. Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. *The Great Discourse on Causation: The Mahānidāna Sutta and its Commentaries*. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 2007.
3. Collins, Steven. *Selfless persons: Imagery and thought in Theravāda Buddhism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
4. Gethin, Rupert. *The Foundations of Buddhism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
5. Gombrich, Richard. *Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006.
6. Gough, Archibald Edward. *The Philosophy of the Upanishads and Ancient Indian Metaphysics*. London: Routledge, 2001.
7. Hume, David. *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Edited by Peter Millican. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
8. Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, M. A. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896.
9. Lai, Changsheng. "The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox." *Erkenntnis* 85, no. 5 (November 1, 2018): 1269–88. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0076-7>.
10. Nanamoli, Bhikkhu and Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans. *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya*. Oxford: Pali Text Society and Wisdom Publications, 2001.
11. Pesala, Bhikkhu, ed. and trans. *The Debate of King Milinda*. Penang: Inward Path, 2001.