Board Governance, Analyst Concern and Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy Effect

Zhen-ni YU

Abstract


In order to help understand the impact of board governance on the dividend distribution of listed companies and improve the governance level of listed companies, this paper used logit and tobit models to empirically study the efficiency of board governance, analyst concern and whether there is a “regulatory paradox†under the semi-mandatory dividend policy by manually collecting relevant data of Chinese listed companies from the year 2001 to 2017. The results show that the governance efficiency of the board is positively related to the company's cash dividends. Analysts pay attention to the negative relationship between the board and the cash dividend. In addition, the positive relationship between the board and the cash dividend is relatively weak after the implementation of the semi-mandatory dividend policy.

Keywords


Board governance, Analyst concern, Semi-mandatory


DOI
10.12783/dtssehs/iceme2019/29583