Analysis on the Dilemma of Performance Appraisal in Colleges from the Perspective of Game Theory

Hao-Wen FENG, Wei-Min OUYANG

Abstract


College performance appraisal is the foundation of human resource management in colleges, and the result of performance appraisal is an important basis for the personnel decision. However, there are some passive phenomena such as nominal appraisal and not obvious incentive effect in the actual execution of performance appraisal in colleges. In this paper, we use the game theory to analyze the game between the college leader as a principal and the middle-level leader as an agent, and analyze the game between the middle-level leader and the teachers, reveal the dilemma of the performance appraisal in the colleges, and put forward some corresponding strategies and suggestions.

Keywords


Game Theory, Principal Agent, Supervisory Scheme, Performance Appraisal


DOI
10.12783/dtssehs/mess2016/9577